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NATIVE AMERICANS VERSUS ARCHAEOLOGISTS:
THE LEGAL ISSUES
C. Dean Higginbotham*
"Let me be a free man, free to travel, free to stop, free to
choose my own teachers, free to follow the religion of my
fathers, free to talk, think and act for myself-and I will obey
every law or submit to the penalty." Chief Joseph of the Nez
Perce, 1878.'
Introduction: Archaeology as Desecration
The peoples of the Old World and the New World were separated
by the forbidding vastnesses of oceans and the even greater
distances of millenia. It is not surprising that when represen-
tatives of cultures of the Old and the New worlds met, their con-
flicts were profound. Nor is it surprising that conflicts continued
until the New World was explored and settled by the peoples of
the Old World. If not surprising, it is at least unsettling that
Native Americans and other Americans still are engaged in con-
flicts.
The subject of this article is the conflict that emerged over the
last decade between archaeologists and Native Americans con-
cerning the excavation of historic and prehistoric skeletal remains
of Native Americans and artifactual materials of religious signifi-
cance.2 Archaeologists have traditionally viewed their activities as
consonant with the highest duties of science to study and under-
stand the world.3 Native Americans, after a long eclipse, are
asserting their ancestral identities and are in various degrees
disturbed by the activities of archaeologists. Despite the fact that
* B.A., Social Studies Education, 1970; M.S., Anthropology, 1971; J.D., 1982;
Ph.D. candidate in Anthropology, Purdue Univ. Associate, Hall, Partenheimer & Kinkle,
Princeton, Ind.
1. Chief Joseph, An Indian's Views of Indian Affairs, 128 N. AM. REV. 412, 433
(1879).
2. See EARLY MAN MAGAZINE (Autumn 1981) for a discussion of the ethical and
scientific dimensions of the controversy. V. Deloria's polemical Custer Died For Your
Sins (1969) presents another point of view. See also Johnson, Professional Responsi-
bilities and the American Indian, 38 AM. ANTIQUITY 129 (1973).
3. See K. CHANG, RETHINKING ARCHAEOLOGY (1967); G. WILLEY & P. PHILLIPS,
METHOD AND THEORY IN AMERICAN ARCHAEOLOGY (1958); W. TAYLOR, A STUDY OF AR-
CHAEOLOGY (1948); V. CHILDE, PIECING TOGETHERTHE PAST (1956); THEDEVELOPMENT OF
NORTH AMERICAN ARCHAEOLOGY (J. Fitting ed. 1973).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons,
AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW
the controversy has been incorporated into larger political strug-
gles for increased recognition of Native American rights, it is
nonetheless apparent that many Native Americans are sincere in
their desire that modern American society respect their religious
beliefs and the remains of their ancestors. Thus the conflict is a
continuing clash of disparate cultures.
Native Americans are by no means a homogeneous group. It
has been estimated that at the time of Columbus' voyages, more
than five hundred mutually unintelligible languages were spoken
in North America." Currently, some two hundred fifty tribes are
recognized by the federal government.' With members scattered
in all fifty states, the tribes have differing perspectives and
desires.6 It is therefore difficult to articulate a world view
representative of all Native Americans.7 Presumably, a generally
accepted position would be that human remains and religious ar-
tifacts of Native Americans should be given the same respect ac-
corded to the human remains and religious artifacts of other
Americans, and that the disturbance of the dead or of religious
objects alters, destroys, or desecrates some relationship with the
spirit world. Therefore, the dead should not be disturbed even if
knowledge of the past could be gained thereby.
The world view of archaeologists is much more uniform than
that of Native Americans. The majority have advanced degrees in
anthropology and are of European descent. Their frame of ref-
erence is that of science generally. Their research is to obtain
knowledge of man and his world for the greater benefit of all
peoples. Archaeologists presumably would maintain that the
systematic study of excavated materials is virtually the only way
to obtain direct knowledge of past peoples and that this is a
desirable goal for American society.8
4. H. DRIVER, INDIANS OF NORTH AMERICA (1980).
5. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1980 (101st ed. 1980).
6. Id.
7. E. HOEBEL, ANTHROPOLOGY 491 (1966) defines "worltl-view" as "The view of
life and the total environment that an individual holds or that is characteristic of the
members of a society. ... It is the human being's inside view, colored, shaped, and re-
arranged according to his cultural preconceptions."
8. Archaeologists in many states have responded to the controversy by a heightened
sensitivity usually expressed in the adoption of guidelines or policy statements, e.g., the
American Committee for Preservation of Archaeological Collections (California), the
Council for the Conservation of Indiana Archaeology, Inc. (Indiana). The Indiana group
has adopted generally the statement of the National Park Service as follows:
Where archaeological investigations encounter marked or identified deliberate in-
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There is no little irony in the clash of these seemingly incom-
patible world views. Archaeologists, and anthropologists gener-
ally, have probably done more to preserve knowledge of Native
American cultures and to dispel misconceptions about those
cultures than any other element in American society. Also, ar-
chaeologists have invariably been motivated to enter the ranks of
the profession because of a deeply held regard for Native
American peoples and their past.
To face off the world views of scientific archaeologists with
traditional Native Americans is to understand the difficulty of the
issue. If either or both sides take uncompromising views, then
conflict is inevitable. The probablk consequence is a legal resolu-
tion of such matters. This article addresses the legal issues likely
to arise in these cases.
The General Issue
What rights do American Indians have either to influence or to
prevent archaeologists from scientifically investigating ar-
chaeological sites? As with most legal questions, the answers are
largely tentative until courts and legislatures have spoken.
Presently very few court decisions have focused on the issue.
State and federal statutes addressing the question are more com-
mon and increasingly so.
American Indians occupy a special status in the American legal
terments of human remains, Indiana law may be applicable. If this should not be the
case, all prudent and feasible efforts will be made to identify and locate persons who
can demonstrate direct kinship with or descent from the interred individuals. The
[name responsible administrative head] in consultation with the most closely related
family member will determine the proper disposition of the remains. No remains will be
reinterred until the appropriate documentation and study have been made by a
qualified physical anthropologist.
If no direct kin or descendants can be identified or located, but the disinterred
human remains can be shown to have ethnic affinity to specific living groups, then all
prudent and feasible efforts will be made to seek out traditional spiritual leaders,
elders, or representatives for these groups. The [name responsible administrative head]
in consultation with these leaders, will make a decision concerning the proper disposi-
tion of the remains. No human remains will be reinterred until after appropriate
documentation and study are completed by a qualified physical anthropologist.
If the disinterred human remains cannot be identified with any specific contem-
porary group, the specific practices of any particular group are not applicable.
Therefore, [name institution] will curate the remains with responsible and sensitive at-
titudes in keeping with the dignity and respect to be accorded to all exhumed human
skeletal remains and in accordance with professional curation standards.
For defining "direct kinship," "ethnic," and "traditional representatives," see 25
C.F.R. § 54 (1980).
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framework. 9 Originally recognized as sovereign nations, Indians
continue to hold some measure of inherent sovereignty.' 0 A
special relationship exists between the federal government and In-
dians. Since the landmark decision of Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia" Indians have been regarded, by the courts at least, as
wards of a benign federal government. Consequently, Indian
relationships with states and individual citizens have been subject
to a continuing tension between state and federal authority.'
2
Generally, the sources of fights of Indians are to be found in
the United States Constitution, in federal statutes, under treaties,
by way of inherent tribal sovereignty, and in state statutes. How
the rights found in these sources attach is largely determined by
the location of archaeological sites, i.e., whether the location is
on private property, state property, federal property, or tribal
(reservation) property. These matters will now be separately con-
sidered.
I. Rights Under the United States Constitution
The First Amendment
The first amendment as it applies to religious matters has two
elements."' The first is the establishment clause, which rigidly
limits the role of government in religious affairs. The second is
the free exercise clause. The general thrust of these clauses is to
allow for diverse religious beliefs and activities within society,
subject to some reasonable limitations that government may im-
pose.' 4 In Cantwell v. Connecticut,"' Justice Roberts enunciated
the fundamental principle:
The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of
religion has a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls
compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the prac-
9. Oliver, The Legal Status of American Indian Tribes, 38 OR. L. REV. 193 (1959).
10. See Comment, Inherent Indian Sovereignty, 4 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 311 (1976).
11. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). Swindler, Politics as Law: The Cherokee Cases, 3 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 7 (1975) analyzes Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and Worcester v. Georgia,
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
12. See generally Note, The American Indian-Tribal Sovereignty and Civil Rights,
51 IowA L. REV. 654 (1966); Note, The Constitutional Rights of the American Tribal In-
dian, 51 VA. L. REV. 121 (1965).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; ....
14. Pfeffer, The Supremacy of Free Exercise, 61 GEo. L.J. 1115 (1973).
15. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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tice of any form of worship. . . . On the other hand, it
safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion.
Thus the Amendment embraces two concepts-freedom to
believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the
nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains sub-
ject to regulation for the protection of society.1 6
The free exercise clause thus extends to individuals the right to
believe virtually anything that can be construed as a religious
matter, but acts based on that belief are subject to reasonable
government regulation. The Court in Cantwell also enunciated
the now familiar doctrine that the first amendment is applicable
to the states through the fourteenth amendment.17 In any legal
contest between archaeologists and Native Americans, it is very
likely that the free exercise issue will be raised.
The United States Supreme Court recently declined to hear the
issue in Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority.'" The issue
arose in that case on a challenge by members of the Cherokee
Tribe to the activities of the TVA in building the Tellico Dam and
Reservoir. The plaintiff Indians argued that the destruction of
religious and village sites by excavation and inundation imper-
missibly abridged their freedom of religion by denying them ac-
cess to these sites. Plaintiffs also argued that the destruction of
the sites disturbed important relationships between this world and
the spiritual world. The district court in a memorandum opinion
held that the free exercise clause does not give individuals the in-
herent right to enter property absent some property right in the
individuals. 19 The court reasoned that in order to state a claim
under the free exercise clause a plaintiff must show some coercion
by government of actions based on religious beliefs. 20 The court
found that the only coercive action by the TVA would be denial
of access to the Little Tennessee River valley and that there is no
precedent for limiting the property rights of anyone to allow the
free exercise of religion to others. Therefore, plaintiffs failed to
state a cognizable free exercise claim.2 '
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals on review affirmed the
16. Id. at 303-04.
17. Id. at 303.
18. 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
19. Sequoyah v. TVA, 480 F. Supp. 608 (E.D. Tenn. 1979).
20. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248-49 (1968).
21. Sequoyah, 480 F. Supp. at 611-12.
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judgment of the district court but on somewhat different
grounds. The court acknowledged that property interests were an
important but not the only consideration.2 2 The court determined
that the Supreme Court decisions in Sherbert v. Verner23 and
Wisconsin v. Yoder 4 now require a two-step analysis for
deciding a free exercise claim. 25 First, it is necessary to determine
whether government action burdens the exercise of plaintiff's
religion. Second, if a burden is found then it is necessary to
balance the government's interest with the burden to plaintiff, the
government being required to show a compelling reason for its
action. The court never reached the second tier of the analysis
because it found that under "the quality of the claims" test of
Yoder,26 plaintiffs had not established a sufficient burden to
allege infringement of a constitutionally cognizable first amend-
ment right.27 The court said plaintiffs had not demonstrated that
worship at that particular geographic location was either (1) "in-
separable from their way of life," ' 28 (2) "the cornerstone of their
religious observance," 29 or (3) "plays the central role in their
religious ceremonies and practices." 30 The court found that
because plaintiffs presented no claim of centrality or indispensa-
bility connected with their religious observances in the Little Ten-
nessee River valley, they had not shown a cognizable burden to
reach the threshold of a free exercise claim." One judge dissented
from the opinion and chided the majority for failing to remand
the case so that plaintiffs could offer evidence concerning the
centrality of the sites to the Cherokee religion.
3 2
The opinion by the Sixth Circuit in Sequoyah apparently leaves
open the possibility in future cases for plaintiffs to argue the cen-
trality of sites to religion. This in turn would bring into play the
balancing test of the second tier of the court's analysis. Given the
centrality requirement of the first tier and the balancing test of
the second, it is clear that if other courts follow the Sixth Circuit,
22. Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1164.
23. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
24. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
25. Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1163.
26. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
27. Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1165.
28. Id. at 1164, citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
29. Id., citing Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979).
30. Id., citing People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69
(1964).
31. Id. at 1164-65.
32. Id. at 1165.
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Native American plaintiffs face a difficult task in vindicating
their free exercise rights connected with religious sites on other
than their own property. Three recent decisions on substantially
similar facts indicate this is likely to be the result.
In Badoni v. Higginson," Navajo Indians claimed that Lake
Powell encroached upon their religious site within the Rainbow
Bridge National Monument in Utah. The district court granted
summary judgment for the government on two grounds-lack of
a property interest in plaintiffs, and that the government's in-
terests outweighed the interests of the plaintiff Indians.
3 4
The Tenth Circuit rejected the district court's conclusion that
plaintiffs' lack of property rights was determinative of the first
amendment issue." The court utilized the same approach as Se-
quoyah and followed the two-step process of (1) determining
whether the governmental action creates a burden on the exercise
of plaintiffs' religion, and (2) if a burden is found, whether the
government's interest is sufficient to override the plaintiffs' in-
terest under the first amendment. The court concluded that the
government's interest was compelling; thus it did not need to ad-
dress the first step of finding a burden. 6 The approach of the
Tenth Circuit indicates that the two-step hurdle is not sequential,
i.e., a court need not first determine if plaintiffs have a qual-
ifiable religious claim under the Yoder test before balancing the
respective interests of government and plaintiff.
The Navajo plaintiffs also had asked for the issuance of regula-
tions to control tourists so that plaintiffs could conduct their
religious ceremonies at Rainbow Bridge. The court in dictum re-
jected this on the ground that such regulations would be "a clear
violation of the Establishment Clause." 37 Thus the Badoni plain-
tiffs not only were told that their first amendment free exercise
claims were insubstantial relative to the government's interest but
that the establishment clause actively prevented the government
from supporting the practice of their religion.
A similar conclusion was reached in Crow v. Gullet.3" In Crow
33. 455 F. Supp. 641 (D. Utah 1977). The plaintiffs alleged that the lake waters had
drowned some of the Navajo gods and that the influx of tourists desecrated the prayer
spot.
34. Id. at 644-45.
35. Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 176 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom.
Badoni v. Broadbent, 452 U.S. 954 (1981).
36. Id. at 177.
37. Id. at 179.
38. 541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982).
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a class action was brought on behalf of individuals who practice
the Lakota and Tsistsistas religions. The plaintiffs sought to have
certain construction projects halted or removed from Bear Butte
State Park in the Black Hills on the grounds that these projects
interfered with the free exercise of their religion and to regulate
activities of the general public at the park so that plaintiffs could
conduct various religious practices free from interference. 9 The
court found that plaintiffs had not established a sufficient burden
on their free exercise rights to have a cognizable claim under the
first amendment. 0 The court strongly hinted that any regulation
of visitors in favor of Indian religious practices would violate the
establishment clause and indicated that park accommodations
already extant for the exclusive use of Indians in the practice of
their religions may already be violative of the establishment
41
In Hopi Indian Tribe v. Block,42 the Hopi Tribe sought to en-
join the development of a recreational facility in the Coconino
National Forest. One of their claims was that their free exercise
of religion required that the mountains remain free of man-made
disturbances. Again it was held by the court that free exercise
claims do not extend so far as to determine the uses to which the
government may put its property because plaintiffs had not
shown a sufficient burden on their free exercise rights and
because of the establishment clause.43
These cases indicate that free exercise rights alone are not likely
to be sufficient grounds for restricting government actions on
government lands. However, the Supreme Court has apparently
added another element for courts to consider in free exercise
cases. In Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment
Security Division,4 4 the Court held that even if the state's interest
is greater, the regulation or restriction may nevertheless be invalid
if the state's interest can be achieved by less restrictive alternative
means. Whether this consideration would have altered the above
decisions is moot, but it is an issue that can now be raised in ap-
propriate circumstances.
39. Id. at 787-88.
40. Id. at 794.
41. Id.
42. No. 81-0481, 8 I.L.R. 3073 (D.D.C. June 15, 1981), aff'd No. 81-1912 (D.C.
Cir. May 20, 1983).
43. Id. at 3075.
44. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
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The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment has
been a powerful force for the vindication of unequal treatment of
racial and minority groups. 45 The fourteenth amendment refers
specifically to the states and not to the federal government. It has
been consistently held, however, that the same guarantee of equal
protection applies to the federal government by way of the due
process clause of the fifth amendment."
The doctrines the Supreme Court has promulgated to enforce
the equal protection clause have undergone substantial evolution
in the modern era. 7 The Warren Court produced a relatively
rigid two-tier approach: (1) strict scrutiny of legislation if there
exist suspect classifications or an impact on "fundamental
rights," and (2) limited scrutiny (deference) for other legisla-
tion. 48 The standard set by the Court to meet strict scrutiny was a
compelling state interest, thus applying to the ends of legislation
as well as the means. 49 The Burger Court has kept the framework
of the two-tier approach but has moved from its rigidity to strike
down legislation on less exacting bases.5 0
Presumably, Native Americans challenging governmental ac-
tions resulting in the excavation of religious and burial sites could
rely on the equal protection guarantee. The basic argument would
be that the remains and artifacts of Native Americans are unfairly
discriminated against to the detriment of the fundamental rights
of living Native Americans. As a factual matter, only the burial
and religious sites of Native Americans are regularly subjected to
45. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV: "[Nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the law." Some important cases to have addressed this
language are Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
46. U.S. CONSr. amend. V: "[N]or shall any person ... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; ... " Two cases to cite this principle are Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) and Bolling v. Sharp, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). For a general discus-
sion, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNsrrrmoNAL LAW 992 (1978).
47. See Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAiv. L. Rav. 1 (1972); Developments in the
Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAIv. L. Rav. 1065 (1969).
48. See discussion in articles at note 47.
49. Id.
50. See Marshall's dissent in San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 70 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissent), where he outlines what he argues is a sliding
scale of scrutiny in equal protection decisions.
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archaeological excavation and study in the United States."'
Therefore, because race is a suspect classification, the differential
treatment of Native American remains by governmental author-
ities can only be justified by a compelling governmental interest.
In practice this is an almost impossible burden for government to
bear.
The chief difficulty with this argument is the question of stand-
ing. The general rule is that protection of cemeteries can be in-
voked only through rights existing in living persons.5 2 Generally
this has been held to mean rights in the next of kin." But when
some of the heirs are unknown or are too numerous to determine,
a representative suit may be maintained.14 When dealing with ar-
chaeological sites of any substantial antiquity, it clearly is a very
difficult matter to determine direct familial relationships.
Absent standing in living persons to invoke their own rights
under the equal protection clause, the question becomes does the
clause afford any protection to the remains of persons the great
majority of whom died before the sovereignty of the United
States existed? The question has apparently never been addressed
by a court, but the thrust of Anglo-American jurisprudence is
that only the living have protectible rights."
The Indian plaintiffs in Sequoyah apparently sought to bring
the equal protection claim as central to their case. 6 For reasons
that are not apparent in either the district court's or the Sixth Cir-
cuit's opinions, the equal protection claim was not addressed by
either court.
The TVA caused to be excavated more than one thousand In-
dian graves, the remains of which were stored in boxes for scien-
tific study. 7 The remains of persons of other races were reburied
51. There is no quotable source for this assertion. The experience of the author is
that this is the case. A check of laboratory and museum accessioning would presumably
support the contention. Of course, the statement only applies to materials actually ex-
cavated in the United States, not to materials brought here from elsewhere for study.
52. See Anderson v. Acheson, 132 Iowa 744, 110 N.W. 335 (1907); Meagher v.
Driscoll, 99 Mass. 281 (1868); Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 50 N.W. 238 (1891); St.
George Indep. Serbian Orthodox Church, 326 Pa. 218, 191 A. 655 (1937), for represen-
tative holdings.
53. Codell Constr. Co. v. Miller, 304 Ky. 708, 202 S.W.2d 394 (1947); Gostkowski
v. Roman Catholic Church, 262 N.Y. 320, 186 N.E. 798 (1933); Brownlee v. Pratt, 77
Ohio App. 533, 68 N.E.2d 798 (1946).
54. Codell Constr. Co. v. Miller, 304 Ky. 708, 202 S.W.2d 394, 397 (1947).
55. See F. JAim s & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 393 (2d ed. 1977) for a general
discussion of who may be parties to invoke the jurisdiction of courts.
56. Petition for Certiorari, No. 80-284, Sequoyah v. TVA, at 2.
57. Id. at 3.
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with suitable respect to religious beliefs.58 If it is possible to
violate the equal protection clause based on the treatment of the
dead of different races, this would appear to be the fact situation
necessary to do so. The failure of the courts to address the equal
protection issue leaves unanswered an important issue relative to
the rights of Native Americans in their ancestors.
Is it possible to draw a principled distinction between Indian
and non-Indian cemeteries? On a strictly objective level, it pro-
bably is not. It is clear, though, why archaeologists draw the
distinction. They excavate ancient graves to acquire information
about past societies that is obtainable in no other way. The
physical remains and artifacts themselves are of secondary impor-
tance. The scientific value of these materials represents the only
principled justification for their excavation. Nevertheless, it is
difficult to state a convincing argument for the discriminatory
treatment of skeletal remains in the face of sincere appeals by
Native American peoples.
Since, as we have seen, under the common law only the heirs of
individuals could assert their legal rights to protect the deceased's
grave, there has remained some question in common law jurisdic-
tions as to who protects cemeteries when the heirs are no longer
knowable. 9 In the absence of statutory authority, the protection
of cemeteries has been maintained by organizations that may gen-
erally be referred to as cemetery associations.6" However, the pro-
tection of cemeteries and graves has been regarded as a special
duty under the equitable jurisdiction of courts. 61 Nevertheless,
cemeteries have been recognized as being abandoned. 62 When a
cemetery has been abandoned there is apparently no common law
recognition of a right in anyone to protect the graves from dis-
turbance. Thus it would be possible to argue that there is no
denial of equal protection for abandoned Indian graves because
all abandoned graves are without protection.63
58. Id.
59. Codell Constr. Co. v. Miller, 304 Ky. 708, 202 S.W.2d 394 (1947).
60. 14 AM. JUR. 2d Cemeteries §§ 5-7.
61. Brown v. Hill, 284 Ill. 286, 119 N.E. 977 (1918); Beatty v. Kurtz, 27 U.S. (2
Pet.) 566 (1829). See also 14 Am. JUR. 2d Cemeteries § 43.
62. Frost v. Columbia Clay Co., 130 S.C. 72, 124 S.E. 767 (1924).
63. The Cherokee plaintiffs of Sequoyah might take an ironic satisfaction in visiting
the Squire Boone Caverns located near Corydon, Indiana. The proprietors of the caverns
have excavated the remains of a man whom they believe to be Squire Boone, the brother
of frontiersman Daniel Boone. They have placed these remains in a small wooden coffin
which is on display in the caverns.
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The Ninth Amendment
The ninth amendment to the United States Constitution states:
"The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people."64 Though this language has been infrequently utilized or
interpreted by the courts, that it is in the Constitution suggests
that it has some meaning beyond being a mere redundancy. 6 In
Griswold v. Connecticut" two Justices joined with Justice Gold-
berg in a concurrence that indicated their belief that the ninth
amendment could be used to protect certain fundamental rights
beyond those listed expressly in the Constitution.
Despite the lack of clear precedential authority for the proposi-
tion, Native American plaintiffs should nonetheless be able to
argue that the protection of ancestral graves and religious sites is
a right commonly recognized by all persons and worthy of
judicial cognizance under the ninth amendment. Justice Goldberg
in Griswold suggested that courts look to the "traditions and
conscience of our people" 67 to determine whether a principle is of
such character as to be fundamental.
The thrust of this argument would not be that the ninth
amendment grants any substantive rights but that certain inalien-
able rights exist because of their recognized importance and pro-
fundity to all people. Such judicially recognized rights would, of
course, not be absolute but only cognizable in the process of
judicial determinations. The district court in Sequoyah6" simply
dismissed the plaintiffs' ninth amendment claims on the ground
that the amendment grants no substantive rights. While this is ob-
viously true, it misses the point of interpreting what the ninth
amendment in fact does do.
The ninth amendment could also be argued to have an added
dimension in application to Native Americans. The United States
Supreme Court has long held that Indian tribes retain all their in-
herent sovereignty that Congress has not expressly revoked. 9
This being so, the language of the ninth amendment would ap-
pear to be an added guarantee that rights under existing tribal
sovereignty cannot be denied or disparaged.
64. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
65. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
66. 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
67. Id. at 487, citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
68. Sequoyah, 480 F. Supp. at 611.
69. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
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The Question of Standing
The language of article III, section 2 of the United States Con-
stitution states: "The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in
Law and Equity, .. ." [and] ".. .- to Controversies ..... " The
general requirement is that the party who is asserting a constitu-
tional claim must have sustained or been threatened with substan-
tial harm or detriment as a result of the action complained of,70 or
that the interest being asserted is within the zone of interests the
constitutional provision was intended to protect. 71 The Supreme
Court in Baker v. Carr 2 said that the gist of standing is whether
the party has such a "personal stake in the outcome of the con-
troversy" to ensure that the issues will be adequately litigated.
The modern trend has been to allow a much broader range of
plaintiffs to have standing to bring otherwise justiciable con-
troversies.73 But the issue can still be a bar to some plaintiffs. In
United States v. Richardson71 the Supreme Court noted that
standing has been greatly expanded, but it concluded that it
should not be expanded so far as to have no meaning. 71
As to noneconomic injuries in particular, the Court has al-
lowed a very liberal standard. In United States v. SCRAP 76 the
Court indicated that a plaintiff need only allege some "injury in
fact" (economic or noneconomic) to itself. This standard would
apparently only bar a plaintiff with abstract claims of generalized
harm.
77
In the federal court cases discussed earlier in regard to the first
amendment issue (Sequoyah, Badoni, Crow, and Hopi Indian
Tribe), the courts had no difficulty in finding that the Indian
plaintiffs had standing to raise the issue. But, as noted previ-
ously, the question may be more difficult if an equal protection
claim is raised. Traditionally, Anglo-American courts have only
recognized rights to protect graves in the heirs at law. 7 To
recognize standing in Indian plaintiffs in regard to graves of
70. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1970).
71. Association of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
72. 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
73. Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 450 (1970).
74. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
75. See also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
76. 412 U.S. 669, 686 (1973).
77. This was the general conclusion that banned the plaintiffs from standing in
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1970).
78. Jacobus v. Congregation of Children of Israel, 107 Ga. 518, 33 S.E. 853 (1899);
Mitchell v. Thorne, 134 N.Y. 536, 32 N.E. 10 (1892).
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unknown kinship would represent an expansion of standing be-
yond the current common law rule. Of course, such expansion is
not unknown.
The Commerce Clause
The commerce clause of the United States Constitution reads
in its entirety that Congress shall have the power "to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, among the several States and
with the Indian Tribes.""' When this power is coupled with the
trusteeship power of Congress over Indian tribes,8 0 it is evident
that the federal government largely supersedes the states in the
supervision of Indian tribes. This circumstance will be addressed
more thoroughly under the heading of "Inherent Tribal Sover-
eignty," infra. Suffice it to say, at this heading, that the federal
government has largely reserved unto itself the role of law giver
to the Indian tribes.
It is not clear what role the commerce clause could play in the
determination of Indian rights vis-a-vis archaeological interests,
but presumably federal statutes justifiable under the commerce
power could regulate, if only indirectly, archaeological activities.
II. Rights Under Federal Statutes
The American Indian Religious Freedom Act
The American Indian Religious Freedom Act8 was passed in
1978. It provides as follows:
[H]enceforth it shall be the policy of the United States to
protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent right
of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional
religions of the American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native
Hawaiians, including but not limited to access to sites, use and
possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship
through ceremonials and traditional rites.8"
Any statute dealing with religious matters must tread cau-
tiously around the establishment clause. Therefore, it may be
asked to what extent this language is precatory; the answer can
79. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
80. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (Supp. IV 1980).
82. Id. at § 1.
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only come with experience. It has been suggested that the "law
clarifies the Indian's first amendment right to freedom of
religion." 83 Presumably, it does so by mandating that federal of-
ficials respect the existing rights of American Indians. It would
seem impermissible that the Act enhance the rights of Indians to
practice their religions.
May Indians rely on the Act to recover "sacred objects"? It
has been suggested that it would be useful in reclamation at-
tempts."' Presumably, the reclamation could not be enforced
under the Act. If it were, it would seem to violate the establish-
ment clause. The only way in which this could be avoided is if the
Indians were already entitled to the sacred objects and they were
being wrongfully withheld from them. In this case the Act merely
conforms to Indian rights already existing under the free exercise
clause of the first amendment. The only other possibility is if the
government or other party surrenders the objects voluntarily. The
holdings of Hopi Indian Tribe v. Block8" and Crow v. Gullet 6
comport with the above analysis. Both courts held that the Act
only ensures that Indians receive their rights that already exist
under the first amendment. In Hopi Indian Tribe the court
stated:
The Act was meant to insure that American Indians were
given the protection that they are guaranteed under the First
Amendment; it was not meant to in any way grant them rights
in excess of those guarantees . . . .The Act does not require
that access to all publicly owned properties be provided to the
Indians without consideration for other uses or activities, nor
does it require that Native traditional religious considerations
always prevail to the exclusion of all else. 7
This analysis leads to the conclusion that the Act is clearly not
a talisman for Native Americans wishing to assert religious claims
to preferential recovery of sacred objects or unrestricted use of
religious sites. The Act extends only as far as the first amend-
ment.
83. Note, Indian Rights: Native Americans Versus American Museums-A Battle
for Artifacts, 7 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 125, 144-45 (1979).
84. Id. at 145.
85. No. 81-0481, 8 I.L.R. 3073, 3076 (D.D.C. June 15, 1981), aff'd No. 81-1912
(D.C. Cir. May 20, 1983).
86. 541 F. Supp. at 793-94.
87. Hopi Indian Tribe, 8 I.L.R. at 3076.
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The Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979
The Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 197988 is
aimed at preserving and protecting the archaeological resources
found on federal and Indian lands.8 9 Before passage of this Act,
federal authorities had to rely on the Antiquities Act of 1906.90
This law imposed criminal sanctions on anyone misappropriating
an "object of antiquity" from federal land. However, the Anti-
quities Act suffered from serious shortcomings. It failed to define
adequately what an "object of antiquity" is, and the criminal
penalties were relatively light. In United States v. Diaz9 the
Ninth Circuit held that the Antiquities Act was unconstitutionally
vague.
The Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979 signifi-
cantly improves the operation of the Antiquities Act. It displaces
the term "object of antiquity" with the term "archaeological
resources" and adequately defines it. 92 This should overcome the
vagueness problem. Further, the new Act has much more bite in
the enforcement provisions. 3
The 1979 Act carefully provides for the differing concerns in-
herent in Indian and federal lands. The Act does not prohibit ar-
chaeological activities, but it does require that permits be ob-
tained before archaeological investigations proceed.94 The is-
88. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-47011 (Supp. V 1981).
89. See 16 U.S.C. § 470aa(b) (Supp. V 1981). See also Northey, The Archaeological
Resources Protection Act of 1979: Protecting Prehistory for the Future, 6 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REv. 61 (1982) for an especially thorough discussion of the reasons for the Act.
90. 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (Supp. V 1981).
91. 499 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1974).
92. 16 U.S.C. § 470bb(1) (Supp. V 1981):
The term "archaeological resource" means any material remains of past human life or
activities which are of archaeological interest, as determined under uniform regulations
promulgated pursuant to this chapter. Such regulations containing such determination
shall include, but not be limited to: pottery, basketry, bottles, weapons, weapon projec-
tiles, tools, structures or portions of structures, pit houses, rock paintings, rock carv-
ings, intaglios, graves, human skeletal materials, or any portion or piece of any of the
foregoing items. Nonfossilized and fossilized paleontological specimens, or any portion
or piece thereof, shall not be considered archaeological resources, under the regulations
under this paragraph, unless found in archaeological context. No item shall be treated
as an archaeological resource under regulations under this paragraph unless such item is
at least 100 years of age.
93. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470ee & ff (Supp. V 1981). Possible penalties now range from
$10,000 to $100,000 and from one to five years incarceration.
94. 16 U.S.C. § 470cc (Supp. V 1981). An exception to the permit is allowed on In-
dian lands if tribal regulations are preexisting, but this applies only to a tribe or a tribal
member. 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(g)(1).
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suance of permits on Indian lands is subject to the consent of the
Indian or the tribe, and is further subject to the terms and condi-
tions the Indian or the tribe may impose. 5 The Act also calls for
the consent of the Indian or the tribe in regard to the exchange or
ultimate disposition of archaeological resources removed from
Indian lands.96
In sum, the Act provides meaningful protection of the ar-
chaeological resources on federal and Indian lands from the
depredations of those who maliciously or for profit raid archae-
ological sites. It allows responsible archaeological investigations
on public lands, while leaving the decision as to Indian lands with
the Indians.
It should be noted that the 1979 Act is an integral part of the
National Historic Preservation Act.7 The National Historic
Preservation Act provides for the recognition of significant
historic places by means of the National Register of Historic
Places.98 The placement of a property on the Register allows it to
be qualified for favorable treatment under various statutory
schemes.99 Indian tribes are specifically provided for in section
470a(d)(B) so that they may obtain grants for the purpose of pre-
serving historic tribal sites.
Chapter 3-Agreements with Indians
Title 25 U.S.C. Chapter 3.-Agreements with Indians °" is con-
cerned with the nature of the relationship that exists between the
United States government and Indian tribes. Sections 81 to 88
deal with contracts that exist between the two. Sections 71 and 72
concern treaties between them.
By congressional act, dated March 3, 1871,101 the United States
statutorily refused to recognize any Indian tribe as an indepen-
dent nation. As a consequence of this, Congress mandated that
no further treaties would be made with any Indian tribe but that
past treaties would be otherwise honored. By the Act of July 5,
95. 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(g)(2) (Supp. V 1981).
96. Id. § 470dd.
97. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470w-6 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
98. 16 U.S.C. § 470a (Supp. V 1981).
99. Id. § 470a(d) provides for grant-in-aid programs to states for historic preserva-
tion projects. I.R.C. § 191(d) allows for favorable tax treatment of National Register pro-
perties.
100. 25 U.S.C. §§ 71-72 & 81-88 (1976).
101. Id. § 71.
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1862,102 the president was authorized to abrogate treaties with
any Indian tribe when actual hostility existed between the United
States and the Indian tribe.
The primary significance of these statutes is that in order to
determine the substantive rights of Indian tribes with treaties with
the United States prior to March 3, 1871, it is necessary to deter-
mine what rights were retained under these treaties. 03 Pre-
sumably, if such a tribe retained certain rights to practice
religious ceremonies at a particular site, those rights still exist.
The American Indian Bill of Rights
The American Indian Civil Rights Act °'0 has generally been
referred to as the American Indian Bill of Rights. It was enacted
to shore up a breach in the civil liberties of Indians. 05 Prior to
the Act, under the doctrine of tribal sovereignty, Indian tribes
had been held to be exempt from many of the constitutional re-
quirements of the Bill of Rights.' 6 The Act essentially extends to
tribal Indians the constitutional protections of the Bill of
Rights. 107
This should mean that tribal governments must afford their
members the same rights of free exercise of religion, equal protec-
tion, and due process as enjoyed by other American citizens. 08
Thus the earlier discussion in this article of these constitutional
rights presumably would apply to tribal governments in their rela-
tionships with tribal members.
III. Rights Retained: Inherent Tribal Sovereignty
The Uncertain Status of Sovereigns Who Have Trustees
Originally, Indian tribes were autonomous groups of people
living within clearly distinct cultural and social categories. Con-
102. Id. § 72.
103. United States v. Berry, 4 F. 779 (D. Colo. 1880).
104. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1976).
105. See Reiblich, Indian Rights Under the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 10 ARIZ. L. REv.
617 (1968); Sanders, The Bill of Rights and Indian Status, 7 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 81
(1972); Note, The American Indian-Tribal Sovereignty in Civil Rights, 51 IOWA L. REV.
654 (1966).
106. Note, Constitutional Rights of the American Tribal Indian, 51 VA. L. REV. 121,
129-35 (1965).
107. Reiblich, supra note 105.
108. Wounded Head v. Tribal Council of Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reserva-
tion, 507 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1975).
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sequently, tribal members were subject to the laws of the existing
tribal government.'09 It is assumed that the laws of most tribal
governments included sanctions applicable to tribal members who
desecrated ancestral graves or improperly disturbed religious ob-
jects or sites." 0 This exercise of unrestricted tribal sovereignty
continued until displaced or subordinated by the federal govern-
ment of the United States.
In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,"' the United States Supreme
Court held that Indian tribes did not exercise the sovereignty of
foreign nations but rather occupied a position of dependence on
the federal government resembling "that of a ward to his guard-
ian."I I2 Chief Justice Marshall referred to the tribes as "domestic
dependent nations."" 3
In Worcester v. Georgia,"' the Supreme Court held conclu-
sively that the Indian tribes, while subject to federal sovereignty,
were nonetheless independent of state sovereignty. Chief Justice
Marshall concluded that both the historic independence of Indian
tribes and the United States Constitution required this result.'
Thus only the federal government may govern the Indian tribes.
In 1883 the Supreme Court, in Exparte Crow Dog,"6 went so
far as to hold that an Indian tribe had exclusive jurisdiction over
crimes between Indians. In response to this, Congress promptly
enacted the Seven Major Offenses Act of 1885,11 which extended
federal jurisdiction over Indians. The constitutionality of this was
upheld in United States v. Kagama,"81 where the Court held that
Indians were in a "domestic trust relationship" with the federal
government.
The continuing validity of the Worcester doctrine of inherent
109. See M. GLUCKMAN. POLITICS, LAW AND RITUAL IN TRIBAL SoCIErY (1965); S.
ROBERTS, ORDER AND DISPUTE (1979); Redfield, Primitive Law, 33 U. CIN. L. REV. I
(1964), for good introductory discussions of legal anthropology.
110. There exist numerous ethnographic accounts of such acts being punished. For
some examples, see the sources cited in note 109, supra. See also LAW AND WARFARE (P.
Bohannan ed. 1967); GODS AND RITUALS (J. Middleton ed. 1967); K. LLEWELLYN & E.
HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE
(1941). An interesting discussion of the aboriginal tribal law of the Cherokee is found in
Strickland, American Indian Law and the Spirit World, 1 Am. INDIAN L. REV. 33 (1973).
111. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
112. Id. at 16.
113. Id.
114. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 560-61 (1832).
115. Id. at 558.
116. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
117. 23 Stat. 385 (1885).
118. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
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tribal sovereignty was indicated in Williams v. Lee." 9 The Court
held that some state regulation of Indian affairs was permissible,
but only to the extent that it does not unreasonably limit the exer-
cise of tribal sovereignty.
In McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission,'20 the court
noted the trend away from "inherent Indian sovereignty" as a
basis for judicial decision, with an increased reliance on federal
preemption and administrative delegation. Nonetheless, the
Court was consistent with the Worcester doctrine in concluding
that tribal Indians retain all that inherent sovereignty that Con-
gress has not superseded.'
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe122 recognized that Indian
tribes retain quasi-sovereignty, but that these retained powers are
limited by treaties or congressional enactments and must also be
limited to those powers not inconsistent with their status as
nonautonomous states. This holding seems to diminish further
the extent of inherent tribal sovereignty. Now tribal sovereignty
may be wielded to the extent that it does not violate treaties, fed-
eral statutes, and principles of nonautonomy.
The extent of tribal sovereignty nevertheless remains broad in
regard to activities on tribal lands. In White Mountain Apache
Tribe v. Bracker,'23 the Court found that an Indian tribe retains
attributes of sovereignty over tribal members and tribal lands.
And in Montana v. United States,124 the Court held that a tribe
may exercise civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on tribal lands by
way of reasonable regulations.
It appears that so long as Congress does not preempt the
tribes' authority, a tribe may absolutely bar archaeological activ-
ities on tribal lands or regulate such activities in a reasonable
manner. A likely situation where this exercise of tribal authority
could clash with other interests is in projects on tribal lands that
would require an environmental impact statement. 2 ' Would In-
dians be able to prevent an archaeological investigation required
by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969?126 Would
such exercise of tribal sovereignty violate the Oliphant concept of
119. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
120. 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
121. Id. at 171-72.
122. 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978).
123. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
124. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
125. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i) (1976).
126. Id. §§ 4321-4361.
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nonautonomy, or must Congress act to limit such exercise? A
similar uncertainty could arise under the environmental mitiga-
tion procedures of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act. 127 Each state is allowed to submit surface regulations to the
Secretary of the Interior for approval. Such approved regulations
are state law. Could a tribe avoid compliance with state require-
ments for the mitigation of archaeological sites on tribal lands on
the basis of tribal sovereignty?
IV. Rights Under State Statutes
It has previously been emphasized that states are greatly limited
in any exercise of state authority over Indian tribes and tribal
lands. This section discusses existing state statutes applicable to
archaeological sites on non-Indian lands. There are three kinds of
state statutes that could apply to historic and prehistoric Indian
burials.
121
First are the state historic preservation statutes. These vary
widely in character but have as their essential purpose the preser-
vation of significant cultural and natural resources within a state.
The determination of the significance of a particular archae-
ological site is made by a state official, usually titled the state ar-
chaeologist or the state historic preservation officer. The Iowa
statute, for example, states: "The state archaeologist shall have
the primary responsibility for the discovery, location and excava-
tion of archaeological sites and for the recovery, restoration and
preservation of archaeological remains in and for the state of
Iowa .... If a site is regarded as being of major importance,
it may be preserved in its entirety. 30 More commonly the ma-
127. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. V 1981). It may be noted that any activities
leading to archaeological studies under SMCRA would probably destroy the sites even-
tually. Thus such a case as hypothesized here would be somewhat pointless. Moreover,
such a confrontation is probably avoidable because section 1300 of SMCRA authorizes
consultations with Indian tribes on the regulations.
128. It is beyond the scope of this article to review systematically these statutes.
Anyone wishing to learn more of the statutes of a particular state should check the sub-
ject index of that state's statutes. Some key terms that may help locate the sought-for
statutes are: preservation, historic, Indians, archaeological, cemeteries, graves, and
reburial.
129. IOWA CODE § 305A.2 (1975).
130. Some prominent examples are the Cahokia Mounds site in Illinois, Mesa Verde
in Colorado, and the Hopewell Mounds in Ohio. Such total preservation of a site is usu-
ally a result of the site being designated a state park and being administered by state park
personnel.
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terials encountered in an archaeological investigation are studied,
packed away, and curated in some state facility.
The second kind of statute of possible significance to the
preservation of Indian remains is the general state statute dealing
with cemeteries and graves. Every state has statutes regulating the
use of land for cemeteries and graves. Many of these statutes are
so general in character as to be applicable to any cemetery or
grave. Indiana, for example, defines cemetery to mean "any land
or structure in this state dedicated to and used, or intended to be
used, for the interment of human remains."I 3 Such a broad defi-
nition could easily include ancient Indian cemeteries. Only
judicial interpretation or legislative clarification can determine
what is actually meant by such language. Certainly, the sites of
ancient cemeteries were not contemplated when such statutes
were enacted, but that need not bar their possible inclusion within
the scope of such acts. Creative legal arguments based on state
burial statutes could be made in an effort to protect Indian burial
grounds. The denial of inclusion of ancient burials within the
protection of general state burial statutes could be a denial of
equal protection under either the fourteenth amendment of the
United States Constitution or similar provisions of state constitu-
tions. As previously indicated, this question is unresolved as to
the federal government"' and has apparently never been ad-
dressed by a state court.
The third kind of state statute of concern here includes those
dealing expressly with Indian burials. They are invariably of re-
cent origin and are of particular significance to both Indians and
archaeologists because they contain provisions for reburial in ac-
cordance with modern Indian religious beliefs."' These statutes
are particularly controversial to scientific archaeologists because
under their provisions archaeologists must surrender human
131. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-14-1-1 (a) (Burns 1982).
132. Petition for Certiorari, No. 80-284, Sequoyah v. TVA.
133. The author is aware of four states with statutes authorizing the reburial of In-
dian remains in appropriate circumstances: CAL. PUB. Rns. CODE §§ 5097.9-5097.99 (pkt.
pt.) (West 1983); IOWA CODE § 305A.7 (pkt. pt.) (1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §
4720 (1964); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 307.08 (pkt. pt.) (West 1983). In 1981, North Carolina
was considering enactment of similar legislation. The state of Washington since 1941 has
had an Indian Graves and Records Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 27.44.010-020 (1951). This
Washington statute makes willful disturbance of Indian graves a gross misdemeanor but
allows excavation for scientific purposes by archaeologists. South Dakota archaeologists
in 1976 adopted the policy of the Iowa Code provision for reburial of Indian remains. See
The Question of Reburial: Archeologists Debate the Handling of Prehistoric Human
Skeletal Remains, EARLY MAN MAGAZINE 25 (Autumn 1981).
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skeletal remains to certain Indian representatives for reburial.'3 ,
These remains have traditionally been curated for purposes of
future scientific study when new scientific procedures are devel-
oped. The archaeologists argue that reburial results in a loss of
future scientific data, and this is unacceptable to them.13' In-
dians, on the other hand, could argue that such statutes are com-
promises, because the statutes respect the interests of both In-
dians and archaeologists. This is so because archaeological study
is expressly allowed for a reasonable period of time and Indian
religious concerns are acknowledged by the required reburial. The
incompatible world views of Indians and archaeologists are un-
likely to allow an easy resolution of the disagreements over these
statutes. They are a significant departure from past state policies
and will certainly continue to raise controversial issues of the
religious rights of Indians and the legal limits of scientific in-
quiry.
V. The Rights of Archaeologists
The primary emphasis of this paper has necessarily been the
rights of Indians in regard to ancient Indian remains. But archae-
ologists also may have some rights relative to these same remains.
Such materials have been the traditional subject matter of archae-
ological investigations. Could such laws as the reburial statutes
discussed supra impermissibly abridge rights archaeologists have
under the United States Constitution?
The due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments both contain the word "liberty." Included in the concept
of "liberty" is the right to pursue a lawful occupation. 36 Related
to this right is the right to engage in a chosen profession free
from unreasonable governmental interference.' 37 Of course,
statutes like the reburia ones do not positively bar archaeological
activities, but they do clearly abridge them. The contest here
would be between the state's police power and the right of an ar-
chaeologist to be free from unreasonable restraints on the prac-
tice of his profession. Is such a restraint as the reburial require-
ment unreasonable?
Another aspect of this question is the issue of property rights.
134. EARLY MAN MAGAZINE, supra note 133, at 25.
135. Id.
136. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
137. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474
(1959). It may be noted that Robel was primarily based on first amendment grounds.
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When ancient remains are buried in the ground, they presumably
belong to the landowner, either as an aspect of the fee or as a
kind of undiscovered personalty. When reduced to possession,
they presumably belong to the possessor absent some law or
agreement to the contrary. Thus, human remains or religious ob-
jects in the possession of a professional archaeologist are either
the personalty of that archaeologist or belong to the entity for
which the archaeologist works. If the entity is the state or federal
government, then the archaeologist's right to possession of the
materials for scientific study become very attenuated. If the
materials are in fact the personalty of the archaeologist, would a
statutory requirement of reburial be an impermissible taking of
private property without just compensation in violation of the
fifth amendment?'38 As a judicial matter, the determination of
ownership between a landowner, an archaeologist, the state, or
possible Indian claimants could be very complex.
Archaeologists might also look to the first amendment as a
possible source of rights to protect the practice of a profession
free from unreasonable government interference. In United States
v. Robel,3 9 the Court recognized that banning a person from
employment was a form of civil punishment and as such must
conform to the requirements of the first amendment. Of course,
the statutes discussed here do not ban an archaeologist from
practicing the profession, but are they reasonable limitations to
such practices? Would the freedom of expression implied in the
first amendment protect a professional from being unduly ham-
pered in practicing the traditional regimen of the profession? It
seems likely that such an issue would have to be resolved by
balancing the interests of the state against the rights of the ar-
chaeologist in the pursuit of scientific inquiry.
It is also conceivable that state or federal laws requiring
reburial in deference to the religious practices of Indians would
be violative of the establishment clause of the first amendment. If
so, then unconstitutionality could be a defense to archaeologists
seeking to avoid the reburial requirement.
To what extent would an archaeologist be liable for violating a
state or federal statute in the course of practicing scientific ar-
chaeology? Acting as an individual, an archaeologist is like any
138. This question has never been adequately resolved and perhaps it is not suscep-
tible to a general, authoritative answer. The Ethical Canons of the Society for American
Archaeology generally disavow any claim of ownership on the part of the individual ar-
chaeologist. It is probably best to judge each case sui generis.
139. 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
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other citizen in respect to the laws. But acting as an employee of
the state or federal government, other considerations arise. In
such employment the archaeologist is an agent of the government
and as such may be protected by the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity. Sovereign immunity is a common law doctrine that holds
a government is immune from suit by a citizen absent the consent
of the government to be sued.14 ° But the protection extends only
so far as the agent is acting within the scope of his authority.
14'
Moreover the agent is not protected if his act was tortious.'
4 2 If
the agent's act was tortious or wrongful, then the agent may be
individually liable.' 43 Therefore, using the above analysis, an ar-
chaeologist is not likely to be held liable in excavating Indian
burials so long as it is done within the scope of employment and
is done nontortiously. It should be noted that the doctrine of




This article has sought to present a comprehensive coverage of
the substantive issues likely to arise in a legal confrontation be-
tween Native Americans and archaeologists concerning the scien-
tific investigation of ancient human remains and religious ob-
jects. The conflict has emotion-laden aspects for each side. The
conceptual world view of Native Americans is essentially incom-
patible with that of scientific archaeologists. Hence, it is unrealis-
tic to expect solutions fully satisfactory to both sides.
The laws and the courts of the United States afford every
citizen the right to seek redress of grievances. If voluntary accom-
modations are not reached, the courts have the wherewithal to
resolve the issues judicially. Potentially, the United States Con-
stitution, federal and state statutes, treaties, and the judicial con-
cept of inherent tribal sovereignty offer many avenues for Native
Americans to attempt to protect ancient graves and religious ob-
jects. Likewise, archaeologists have valid recourse to legal doc-
trines to protect their interests in the scientific study of the past.
It is hoped that in any such contest each side will respect the
sincerity of the other's position.
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